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Post-Socialist Regions in the World System  
David Lane 
 
Abstract 
Following the dismantling of the state socialist bloc, the new independent states sought a 
place in the world order in different contexts and state combinations. The paper considers 
different possibilities, and outlines the formation of regional post-socialist regions. The 
Russian Federation’s past, present and possible future regional alliances are discussed. 
Russia’s economic synergy is considered to be with the European Union. It is contended that 
Russia has been pushed towards the SCO and the BRICS by misguided Western policy. A 
movement to a more pluralistic world system is compared to the unitary paradigm of 
Wallerstein. The rise of a ‘counterpoint’ (a semi-core) to the hegemonic core is considered to 
be a geo-political alternative.  
 
Key Words: regions, Russia, European Union, Eurasian Union, world system, 
Commonwealth of Independent States.  
 
Globalisation of the post-socialist countries 
After the dismantling of state socialism, the post-socialist countries entered the world 
economy. This was a goal shared by modernizers in the Soviet Union and the socialist states 
of central and eastern Europe who believed that joining the world economy would act as a 
stimulus to development.  Progress would be achieved not only through market mechanisms 
displacing the moribund forms of Soviet-type planning but also by inserting the socialist 
states into a more advanced scientific and innovative world capitalism. ‘Joining the world 
economy’ however involved significant changes not only in the internal politics of the 
socialist states to make them compatible to the capitalist world order but also in international 
alignments. The depth and width of their participation also defined the extent of their 
globalisation. The full implications of dismantling the structures of state socialism had not 
been seriously considered by those advocating radical reforms.  
 
Four major theoretical scenarios presented themselves. Firstly, a reformed socialist bloc 
keeping the existing institutions in place; secondly, the dissolution of the regional socialist 
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associations (the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 
and the participation of post-socialist countries as sovereign states in the world system as 
independent national actors; thirdly, the installation of the post-socialist countries into the 
existing economic and political blocs of NATO and the European Union; and finally, the 
formation of a new economic region, possibly in association with rising capitalist countries 
currently excluded from the hegemonic core, such as China and India. Each of these 
approaches makes assumptions about the ways in which the world system of states operates 
and how a reformed socialist system or a post-socialist system would be able to flourish. 
 
Coexistence of a Reformed Socialist Bloc 
The first scenario is predicated on the assumption that markets would develop both within 
and between members of the state socialist bloc under the reforms promised in Gorbachev’s 
perestroika proposals. It was also widely thought (in the West as well as in the post-
communist countries) that the Warsaw Pact and NATO could eventually be disbanded in 
favour of strengthening the pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). The reasoning behind this thinking was that the more pluralistic reformed post-
socialist states no longer posed a strategic threat to the capitalist countries and thus 
undermined the basis of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.  
 
The economic reforms underpinning the perestroika programme also provided assurances of 
movement to an open competitive market economy. In this context, the CMEA countries 
could have continued in a trading block based on the principles of the GATT/WTO the 
membership of which the reform leaderships aspired. Free trade with third parties could have 
taken the shape either of a customs’ union, or bilateral trading links could have been 
instituted with other trading nations. Either of these courses, though to different degrees, 
would have retained the existing pattern of trade and production whilst leading to a gradual 
re-orientation to world markets. CMEA was organised as a regional concern on the basis of 
planning and the development of national economies. Unlike the European Community, it 
was not market driven. Its internal organisation would have required considerable changes to 
make it compatible to a neo-liberal market model, though it could have continued as a region 
with a state-led developmental strategy. 
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Such a scenario had some economic merit. The European socialist states had secured 
successful comprehensive economic and social development following the Second World 
War. It was capable of reform and development – moves to the market and a more pluralistic 
political system were components of such reforms. Figure 1 shows GDP per capita for 
different economies in 1980 and 1985 expressed in international GK dollars (1990 base)1 
(Maddison-Project, 2013). The USSR in 1985 was certainly poorer than the average West 
European country, though it also included relatively undeveloped agrarian Republics in 
central Asia. The more advanced East European states were comparable to the poorer West 
European ones as illustrated by the comparison of Czechoslovakia and Ireland. The advocates 
of reform believed that they could secure a qualitative improvement in economic efficiency 
and growth. 
 
What is of now of considerable relevance is that the European socialist states were very much 
in advance of eight Latin American countries (average), South Korea and China which later 
made spectacular advances.  
 
Figure 1. USSR GDP in Comparative Perspective: 1980 and 1985 (Maddison-Project, 2013). 
GDP Per Capita USSR and others 1980, 1985
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1
 GK international dollars. The Geary–Khamis dollar is a measure similar to purchasing 
power parity. In this source data use as a base the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar in 1990 
(Maddison-Project, 2013). 
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Central Europe: From National Capitalism to the European Union 
Following the dismantling of the state socialist system, such within system reforms were not 
adopted. In the initial break-up of the socialist bloc, it was assumed that nation states are 
sovereign and act autonomously to promote their own interests. The transformation of the 
socialist states involved the privatisation of state assets and the assertion of national 
independence. Both of these developments led to strengthening the identity of the ‘New 
Independent States’ and weakened any moves to regionalism which would have 
compromised their sovereignty.  
 
Initially, the post-socialist states of central Europe embarked on the promotion of a national 
form of capitalism. Their moves to the Western market and the opening of their economies to 
Western investment occurred concurrently with the breaking of links between the socialist 
states which involved a network of contracts and markets.  
 
However, the post-socialist central European states were simply too weak economically and 
too small spatially to operate as effective economic entities when exposed to the capitalist 
market. Jan Drahokoupil has shown how attempts in central Europe to create forms of 
national capitalism failed (Drahokoupil, 2009).  
 
A major group of central European countries (initially the Visegrad countries) looked for 
economic integration with the European Economic Community and for strategic security in 
NATO. From the post-socialist countries’ points of view, any continuation of the Soviet-type 
economic and political framework was incompatible with their political and ideological 
objectives of joining or rejoining their European home. Their economic purpose was to build 
a capitalist market system optimistically in a neutralized and peaceful Europe. 
 
The spokesmen for the post-socialist states of central and eastern Europe (CEECs) cloaked 
their political motives in idealist terms. The symbolic attraction of a return to their ‘European 
home’ would be a sharp break with the Russian dominated Soviet past. ‘Europe’ would be a 
positive form of identity: economically rich, and culturally civilized. ‘Joining democracy’ 
would secure peace, as democracies did not engage in wars (at least not with each other). 
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Membership of the European Union would be economically beneficial. It would increase the 
size of the market, liberalize trade by reducing tariffs and increase foreign direct investment.  
 
There was also a dose of political realism in ‘a return to Europe’. After dismantling the 
Warsaw Pact and CMEA and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union into 15 nation states, the 
weaknesses of the resulting post-socialist European independent states were exposed. The 
European post-socialist political and economic elites were fairly united in supporting a move 
towards integration with the EU. At best, the CEECs would achieve political and economic 
stability and a rising standard of income. At worst, it was better than staying out.  
 
However, the European home was not a collection of individual nation states but a regional 
bloc, organised in the European Economic Community (the European Community in 1993) 
which became the European Union in 2009 under the Treaty of Lisbon. (In the following I 
use the term European Union (EU) to cover all its titles). The membership of this association 
required a reversal of the national state centered developments initiated by the reforming 
elites; such countries were required to adopt the regional norms and to become structurally 
compatible to the institutions of the European economic bloc.  This was legitimated in terms 
of a ‘return to European values’.  
 
The leading Western states – prompted by economic and geo-political interests – sought to 
accommodate the central European post-socialist states within these institutions. An 
economic and political union between the post-communist states and the EU would ensure 
that their economic and political institutions and processes would be compatible with the 
economic and political structures of global capitalism.  Both NATO and the EU had 
complementary policies towards the new independent states which had to meet conditions for 
membership. 
 
From the 1990s, an early differentiation of the former communist states occurred. European 
Agreements were concluded between the EU and the central and east European countries 
(CEECs). As early as December 1990, the EU negotiated with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland on the content of the Agreement which was signed with these states in December 
1991. The Agreements aimed to regularize relationships between the EU and the CEECs and 
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were conducted between the EU and each country. They covered free trade, financial and 
technical assistance, energy, environment and communications. But that was not all. They 
also included the formulation of laws compatible with the single market which particularly 
affecting state subsidies, and freedom of competition.  
 
The objective was to tailor the recipient states to the goals of the EU – the free movement of 
capital, commodities, services and people. Consequently, they influenced the political and 
economic changes taking place in the CEECs in the direction of compatibility with EU 
relations. The PHARE programme (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Economic 
Reconstruction – later extended to other countries) was introduced in 19902 (Mannin, 1999, 
pp. 38-9). Technical assistance was later widened to include political and economic structures 
compatible with a market economy. From 1992, conditionality required the recipient states to 
promote a market economy, democratic competitive electoral practices, human rights, and the 
rule of law. 
 
Membership of the European Union followed when states had met the requirements of the 
Acquis Communautaire. The European Union embarked on a relentless policy of 
enlargement. In 2004, the EU15 became the EU25 with the addition of the central European 
post-socialist states, then the EU27 in 2007 and finally, with the accession of Croatia in 2013, 
the EU28. EU dialogue legitimated the expansion in terms of well-being and military 
security. As democratic states did not fight each other, enlargement was a contribution to 
peace. Economically, a wider market provided opportunities for investment and would 
stimulate sales and profits. Based on a neo-liberal conception of political economy, the free 
movement of goods, services, capital and labour would promote economic well being. By the 
same logic a state-led form of developmental capitalism was precluded. 
 
The implication here is that the European Union would also be strengthened as its borders 
would widen and its laws would prevail over hitherto sovereign states. The newly 
independent CEECs had to acquiesce to limitations on their sovereignty. The post-socialist 
societies were no longer ‘sovereign’ states but ‘member’ states of the EU. Ironically, perhaps, 
                         
2
 Financial support in 1990 this totalled 494 million ECU and 1996, 1,223 million (Mannin, 
1999). 
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having opposed the hegemony of the USSR, the newly independent CEECs had to acquiesce 
to limitations on their independence required by the economic and political conditions 
imposed on prospective members of the EU.  In many ways the conditions were worse. In the 
Soviet CMEA, policy was predicated on national development which in the post war years 
had been successful, whereas in the European Union, neo-liberalism was grounded on free-
market competition in which the weak succumbed to the power of the strong. The European 
Union form of regionalism was not designed to support any state based national development 
strategies. The thrust of the conditionality of the Acquis was to promote market 
competitiveness of the post-socialist states and to insert their economies into the world 
economy within the framework of a neo-liberal regional European bloc. 
 
The impact of the EU was to the advantage of the core of the old member states. Taking 
advantage of cheap assets in the form of labour and capital, foreign investment poured into 
the central European states. Much of this was portfolio investment which purchased assets in 
state ownership, which we consider further below. Foreign investment led to the return of 
profits as well as products to the home countries. As we see from Table 1, by 2009, the origin 
of imports, and destination of exports of the New Member States, was predominantly from, 
and to, the European Union. Russia was still a considerably trading partner, but far less 
dependent on the EU than the New Member States. Exports to the EU from Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland are respectively 86%, 78% and 78% of the total; whereas their exports 
to Russia come only to 2.7%, 3.6% and 5% per cent respectively. Similar figures apply to 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, though Russia is slightly higher in their export profiles (15%, 
10% and 16%, respectively). Imports have a similar pattern. Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland import 67%, 68% and 62% respectively from the EU; and only 5%, 9% and 10% from 
Russia. This pattern is repeated in the Baltic States, according to the data for 2009 from the 
WTO database. 
 
Table 1. The European Union as Destination and Origin of the New Member States Exports 
and Imports (Per cent of total exports and imports) 2009.  
                      Destination of exports (%) from   
  Ukr Rus CZ Hun Pol Est Lat Lith 
To EU 27 57 85 78 78 63 73 60 
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 Rus 24  2.7 3.6 5 15 10 16 
          
                            Origin % of Imports to:     
  Ukr Rus CZ Hun Pol Est Lat Lith 
From EU 34 44 67 68 62 60 76 58 
 Rus 23  6 9 10 10 11 30 
 
Source: WTO database, data for 2009 (WTO, 2015).  
 
Thus a divergent path opened up between the central European post-socialist countries and 
the states of the former Commonwealth of Independent States. The New Member States were 
incorporated into the institutional core of the world economic order; they were essentially 
subordinate to, and dependent on, the hegemonic members of the EU15. 
 
The CIS Path to the World System:  Joining on the Fringe 
The former republics of the Soviet Union (except the Baltic Republics) remained as 
independent nation states in the world system forming alliances in an ad hoc manner. Major 
policies underpinning reforms in, and later the transformation of, the USSR were intended to 
ensure Russia’s acceptance in the political order of the West. Like the central European 
radical reformers, President Mikhail Gorbachev’s intention was for the USSR to ‘rejoin its 
European home’. Boris Yeltsin’s objective was to ensure that Russia would be a full and 
accepted member of the economically advanced capitalist nations. Following economic 
developments in the central European post-socialist states, in the early 1990s under President 
Yeltsin, Russian policy favoured moving towards ever closer links with, and even 
membership of, the European Union. At his meeting with EU leaders in Corfu in June 1994 
(at which agreements were signed with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden anticipating 
their joining the EU in 1995), Yeltsin declared that Russia’s accord with the EU was ‘an 
historical document which will allow us to continue a course toward entering Europe and 
abolish the discrimination that took place in the past. We move forward as equal partners 
towards our mutual interest (Moscow Times, 1994). A theme visited many times by post-
communist Russian leaders is the notion of a ‘new Europe’ united with Russia which would 
become ‘a dominant force’ in the world (Chicago Tribune, 1998).   
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While the Treaty of Rome provided that any European country could apply for membership 
of the European Economic Community, it became increasingly clear that Russia, for 
economic, political and cultural reasons, was not going to be considered. Exceptionally, 
British Prime Minister John Major envisaged a Europe stretching to the Urals, and Silvio 
Berlusconi, when EU President in November 2003, at the EU summit with Russia, advocated 
Russia's membership. EU policy makers, however, have been cautious (Emerson, 2005) and 
the EU has concluded bi-lateral agreements with Russia. These are based on the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in June 1994. The agreement seeks to further 
joint activity on four areas: a common economic space, a space of freedom, security and 
justice; co-operation in the field of external security; and the promotion of joint projects in 
research, education, and cultural exchange. While Yeltsin envisaged an ‘equal’ union, the 
conditions attached to many EU proposals have entailed neighbouring states adopting EU 
values, standards and procedures.  
 
Following the dismembering of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation’s major foreign 
alliance has revolved around the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which was 
formed in December 1991. This initially brought together the Republic of Belarus, the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine, and later Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Georgia joined in 1993. However, many 
of these countries including Ukraine, which formally left the association in March 2014, have 
had little active presence in the CIS. While a number of significant multinational agreements 
have been made, the CIS remained a very weak association of states with little economic and 
political weight. Unlike the EU, the CIS countries preserved considerable state sovereignty 
and did not form an economic or political union. The association preserved some of the 
functions of the Soviet system – agreements over customs’ control and air traffic control, for 
example. It convened meetings between the military and security forces and coordinated 
services against terrorism. It also promoted exchanges in the sphere of culture and education 
and formed the International Association of the Academies of Sciences. Further 
developments along the lines of the EU were proposed to include greater mobility of capital 
and labour within the CIS. In 1993, a CIS Economic Union Treaty was signed which 
envisaged setting up a free trade area. While many multilateral agreements have been 
concluded, the CIS has lacked effective forms of enforcement and lapsed into a consultative 
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forum between its members. Such forms of discussion should not be completely dismissed as 
they provided for the exchange of views as well as a rudimentary type of socialization of the 
countries’ elites in the face of common problems.  
 
The difference between the central European countries headlong marriage with the 
regionalism of the European Union and the reluctance of the CIS countries to regionalize is 
due to the different weight of national and international interests in shaping policy. The 
newly independent states of central Europe did not form a separate political bloc. They not 
only lacked a hegemonic regional power but also sought to preserve their own political 
independence which they believed would be preserved by membership of the EU.  
 
They became highly penetrated by foreign capital. Foreign investors were able to buy 
industrial and commercial assets in the former socialist states. The massive FDI in what have 
become the New Member States compared to the CIS between 1985 and 2014 is shown in 
Figure 2. Hungary and Czech Republic in 2002 had an inward stock of FDI in excess of 50 
per cent of their GDP, whereas the average for the CIS states was some 15 per cent.  
Bulgaria, one of the latest additions, had an enormous inflow of FDI being 100 per cent of 
GDP in 2010. All the NMS shown on Figure 2 (with the exception of Slovenia after 2006) 
are above the trend line for the CIS states. 
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Figure 2. FDI Inward Stock: New Member States of the EU and CIS average 1990-2014 (% 
of GDP). Source: UNCTAD. 
FDI Inward Stock: New Member States and CIS: 1990-2013
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FDI brought foreign investors, entrepreneurs and executives. Such interests were external 
drivers of internal policy. Membership of the EU was a guarantee of the security of property, 
a reliable currency and a hospitable labour environment for business. The reformist domestic 
political elites were opposed to state intervention and favourably disposed to the market, 
especially when linked to a return to their European home. The image of the European Union 
was positive and, if powers were to be lost to it, it was less threatening (they thought) than to 
the successor state to the Soviet Union – the Russian Federation.  
 
In the CIS states, there was a less fertile soil for foreign investment. Not only geography 
deterred foreign investment, but the political and economic elites were more domestic in 
character. They had been privileged by the privatisation process and were more nation-statist 
in orientation. Excluding the owners of large energy companies (which were concentrated in 
Russia and Kazakhstan), they lacked any incentive to move the state towards a wider regional 
grouping. The drivers of regionalism in the CIS were the state leaders who looked to a wider 
regional association for defence and security purposes in addition to the advantages of a 
larger market. Russian transnational companies, such as Gazprom, were able to pursue their 
global plans of expansion independently of the CIS. As we note in Figure 3, above the trend 
line of the CIS (based on the average of all CIS states) are the two major energy-exporting 
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countries (Russia and Kazakhstan). Russia has been in the forefront of moves to greater 
participation in the European Union, though its Russian-based business class has resisted the 
EU’s terms. It is notable that Ukraine after the events of the coloured revolution in 2008 
moved considerably above the CIS trend line as the leadership of Yushchenko then pushed 
for EU membership and encouraged Western investment to this end. 
Figure 3.   FDI Stock in Selected CIS countries, 1990-2014 (% of GDP) 
FDI Inward Stock Selected CIS: 1990-2014
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http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders 
 
The CIS states were much less economically developed than the central European post-
socialist states. Figure 4 illustrates the gross domestic product (in purchasing power parity) of 
the CIS countries from its inception in 1992 compared to the 28 countries forming the 
European Union
1
. We note a very considerable and growing quantitative gap between the two 
groups. There were also political differences. Unlike in the EU where the New Member 
States would be in an association led by benign foreigners, in the CIS the dominant power 
economically and politically was Russia. As the legitimacy of the new independent post-
socialist states was predicated on independence from Russia, making a firm regional alliance 
ideologically and politically was much more difficult. An ideological base, which might have 
been provided by Eurasianism had few advocates in the Soviet Union and was little known in 
the early transformation period3 (Bassin, Glebov and Laruelle, 2015). The liberal outlook of 
                         
3
 Eurasianism was an ideology developed by Russian speaking people abroad and had little 
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the post-Soviet elites as well as the national basis of the new regimes retarded the 
reformulation of a region based on the boundaries of the USSR. Ironically perhaps, it was 
much more difficult for Russia to lead and implement a new regional association than the 
European Commission in Brussels. Moreover, Brussels had its own plans which included 
forms of cooperation promising some CIS countries (for example, Ukraine) future 
membership. Even Russia under Yeltsin had yearned for a positive economic and political 
alliance with the EU – a desire, as we shall see, endorsed by the Putin leadership. All these 
factors hindered the formation of an effective regional organisation made up of states 
constituting the Commonwealth of Independent States.  
 
                                                                
impact in the Soviet Union (Bassin, Glebov and Laruelle, 2015. 
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Figure 4.  Total GDP: EU28, CIS 1992 to 2014 (International dollars) (IMF WEO, 2015). 
Purchasing power parity (Current international dollars) 
 
Total GDP: EU, CIS 1992 to 2014
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With the CIS proving to be an inadequate basis for a positive geo-economic unit, the Russian 
leadership has had to re-consider its wider economic and strategic alignments. There are three 
major strategic and geo-political ways forward:  the creation of a Eurasian Economic Union; 
the enhancement of links with the European Union; and the formation of a transcontinental 
economic bloc, the BRICS (composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).  
 
The Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union 
Given the lack of success in securing enhanced agreements with the West, under President 
Putin a ‘return to the East’ has figured in political rhetoric. The Eurasian Economic 
Community (Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, though the latter left in 2008) 
was formed in October 2000, followed by the formation of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation in 2003. A Single Economic Space agreement came into effect between Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 2003. Its effectiveness was blunted by Ukraine’s 
insistence on agreements which would not preclude participation in the European Union. It 
was replaced by the Single Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan which came 
into effect in 2012. In January 2015, these three countries formed the Eurasian Economic 
Union – later joined by Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has 
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been guided by the EU’s experience and likens itself to it. It seeks the advantages of    
economies of scale provided by a larger market. It aspires to the EU’s aims of the free 
movement within its territory of labour, capital, goods and services. It respects the free trade 
market principles of the WTO.  
 
Like the European Union, underlying the formation of the EEU is a wider political and geo-
political agenda which uneasily coexists with its free market economic principles. The 
longer-term intention of some Eurasianists is to further a quite distinct form of political 
organisation to that of the current neo-liberal world political and economic order. Their goal 
is to preserve and enhance the economic potentiality of its member states, which involves 
shelter from competition from the world market – which in practice means Western 
transnational companies.  
 
The policy of the Russian Federation under Putin and Medvedev entailed a major change 
towards the West which infringed some established Western assumptions. In its Foreign 
Policy Concept (2000), Russia’s objectives were said to preserve the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the country. It noted critically ‘a growing trend towards the 
establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and political domination 
of the United States.’ It identified ‘attempts to create an international relations structure based 
on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US 
leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (including the use of military force) to key 
issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law’.  
Consequently, Russia has strengthened its control over strategic industries and has challenged 
Western political intervention in Ukraine and the Middle East.  
 
The Eurasian Union, however, is a significant but relatively weak economic player in the 
world economy. As illustrated in Figure 5, though the gap between the EU and the countries 
of the Eurasian Economic Union has declined somewhat since 1982, in 2014 the latter 
contributed less than 5 per cent of global GDP compared to 17 per cent of the European 
Union.  
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Figure 5. Share of World GDP: Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union (IMF 
WEO, 2015). Data PPP in current international dollars.   
GDP % of World Total: Eurasian Econ Union, 
European Union
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Russia has particularly strong links to the countries of the EU. Russia’s trade both in origin 
and in destination is dominated by the European Union. As illustrated in Figure 6, only 
Belarus has a significant export trade with others (Ukraine). It is notable that even China is a 
minor recipient of EEU exports; only Kazakhstan contributes some 18 per cent of its exports 
to China. 
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Figure 6 Eurasian Economic Union: Export Destinations of Goods and Services 2013. 
Export Destinations: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus (2013)
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Source: WTO database, data for 2013 (WTO, 2015). 
 
Imports tell a similar story for Russia (see Figure 7) – the EU is by far the major supplier. 
Kazakhstan and Belarus are somewhat different being highly dependent on Russia after 
which the EU contributes 20 per cent and 25 per cent of the imports of Kazakhstan and 
Belarus. There is then an asymmetrical relationship between the three EEU countries with 
Russia importing very little from Kazakhstan and Belarus.  
 
Figure 7. Eurasian Union: Import origin of Goods and Services (2013). 
Country of Origin of Imports:  Russia Kazakhstan Belarus (2013)
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Source: WTO database, data for 2013 (WTO, 2013). 
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President Putin, basing his argument on common membership of the WTO, has contended 
that both the EU and Eurasian Union should forge a wider pan European association. Here we 
return to the theme of a stronger linkage with the EU as advocated by Yeltsin. On 26 
November 2010, Putin proposed the formation of an association which would promote a 
‘greater Europe’ from Lisbon to Vladivostok. As recently as January 2014, Putin suggested to 
Brussels the establishment of a Free Trade Area between the EU and the Eurasian Union 
(Lavrov, 2014). A year later in January 2015, in a press interview, Vladimir Chizhov, the 
permanent Russian Representative to the EU, opined: ‘Our idea is to start official contacts 
between the EU and the EAEU as soon as possible. Chancellor Angela Merkel talked about 
this not long ago. EU sanctions are not a hinder (sic). I think that common sense advises us to 
explore the possibility of establishing a common economic space in the Eurasian region 
including the focus countries of the Eastern Partnership. We all have common interest’. He 
contrasted the EUs enthusiasm for improving trade links with the USA with its reluctance to 
be flexible with Russia, despite it overwhelming trade interest (Chizhov, 2015).  
 
While this has been either ignored or dismissed, it does have some merit. It might be likened 
to the relationship of the European Free Trade Area with the European Union. The EU has 
negotiated separate agreements with Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and even 
Singapore which promote favourable trade relations. Negotiations between the European 
Union and the USA over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are another 
example of how cooperation is possible between two commercial blocs. Such negotiations 
include bilateral and multilateral agreements on tariffs and public procurement, cooperation 
on regulatory agreements and the enhancement of bilateral trade. Like the EU, the Eurasian 
Union is to be built on the laws of the market and global competition under the rules of the 
WTO. The Russian leadership would envisage the Eurasian Union becoming ‘one of the 
poles of the modern world and would enable forms of collaboration from ‘the Atlantic to the 
Pacific Ocean’ (Putin, 2011). 
Russian policy is systematized in The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 
2013, approved by President V. Putin on 12 February 2013. The underlying thinking is that 
global development should work within regional and international associations. ‘… Russia 
will increase its participation in such formats as the Group of Twenty, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
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India, China and the Republic of South Africa), the Group of Eight, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, the RIC (Russia, India and China) alongside other organizations 
and platforms for dialogue’ (paragraph 30).  
In a key paragraph the concept states that Priority areas of Russian foreign policy include the 
development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS Member States, further 
strengthening of the CIS as a basis for enhancing regional interaction among its participants 
who not only share common historical background but also have great capacity for 
integration in various spheres (Paragraph 42). The Eurasian Economic Union ‘... is being 
formed on the basis of universal integration principles and is designed to serve as an effective 
link between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region’. Russia is considered a European country. 
‘In its relations with the European Union, the main task for Russia as an integral and 
inseparable part of European civilization is to promote creating a common economic and 
humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific’ (Paragraph 56). Russia stands for signing 
a new Russia-EU framework agreement on strategic partnership based on the principles of 
equality and mutual benefit. …. A long-term objective in that area is to establish a common 
Russia-EU market’ (Paragraph 57). 
The Concept devotes a section to regional priorities in which Paragraph 42 states that 
‘Priority areas of Russian foreign policy include the development of bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation with the CIS Member States, further strengthening of the CIS as a basis for 
enhancing regional interaction among its participants who not only share common historical 
background but also have great capacity for integration in various spheres’. Moreover, in 
paragraph 44 we learn that ‘Russia sees as a priority the task of establishing the Eurasian 
Economic Union aiming not only to make the best use of mutually beneficial economic ties 
in the CIS space but also to become a model of association open to other states, a model that 
would determine the future of the Commonwealth states. The new union that is being formed 
on the basis of universal integration principles is designed to serve as an effective link 
between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region’. 
These statements highlight a major dimension of policy of the Eurasian Economic Union 
with the EU. Namely, the promotion of a multi-polar Europe which would involve 
overlapping areas of autonomy. Such regional associations would not be part of a political 
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union but would have mutually advantageous links as provided for under the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The Russian leadership seeks a partnership but not on the 
EU’s terms entailing the adjustment of internal values and institutions to conform to those of 
the EU. 
While a free-trade regime would continue, the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union 
would be shielded by its boundaries from more powerful forces in the European Union. From 
the viewpoint of the EU, such an agreement would further complementary trade policies: the 
EU exporting manufactured goods and importing raw materials, especially fuel. In 2013 
Russia was a major commercial partner of the EU: outside internal EU destinations, Russia is 
the fourth largest export market (6.8%) and the second largest import client (12.2%) (WEO, 
2015) coming after China which has 17 per cent.  
 
The synergy between the EEU and the EU, at least economically, is considerable. Greater 
economic integration would promote political integration enhancing conditions for peace, 
which is a major goal of the EU. Jozsef Borocz has suggested that the motivating force 
behind the EU’s enlargement has been to maintain its world ‘market share’ of GDP (Borocs, 
2015, pp. 20-23). This line of argument has been substantiated by Claude Serfati who has 
shown that profits in the non-financial sector have fallen in the EU since 2007 due to the 
underutilisation of labour and machinery (Serfati, 2015, p. 2). From this point of view the 
EU, if it pursues positively stronger links with the Eurasian Union, would secure a substantial 
market for its manufacturing exports as well as a protected source of imports of raw 
materials. The wager on Ukraine, which had a negligible proportion of its trade and was a 
liability as an energy supply conduit, has been a costly blunder. EU policy, which is not our 
concern here, was unduly influenced by geo-political interests and especially by the concerns 
of the USA.  
 
The future relationship between the EU and the EEU is clouded due to the contradictory 
values and interests within both geo-political blocs. On the one hand, the EEU is an institution 
to be modelled on the European Union with its concern for the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and labour. On the other hand, many consider it concurrently to be a vehicle to 
move to a state-led economy exerting different degrees of control. In its least radical form it 
would be a ‘stepping stone’ towards the existing neo-liberal global system, another regional neo-
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liberal bloc.  
 
Russian writers, such as Vinokurov and Tsukarev, envisage the EEU’s long-term economic 
cooperation to lie with the EU and China (Vinokurov and Tsukarov, 2015) – they see Russia 
standing on the two legs of the European Union and China. An acceptance of neo-liberal 
market relationships would move the project towards inclusion in the present global system and 
could be a complementary regional bloc to the European Union. But a partnership between the 
Eurasian Economic Union and the EU is perhaps a visionary scenario, as it would require the 
reversal of many current EU policies. The EU has rejected a closer agreement with Russia 
unless neo-liberal policy conditions and Western values are accepted. The EU would have to 
modify its current expansionist and inclusionary policy to accommodate other regional 
interests with different values and institutional arrangements.  
 
Other critics of moving in an EU direction point out that the history of economic exchange 
between the EU and Russia has not shown beneficial results for Russian industrial 
development. The EU has maintained its superiority in high value added manufacturing. The 
current economic mechanism will doom the EEU to a subordinate position as an exporter of 
primary sector goods. If this is the case, the EEU should look elsewhere: participation in 
value chains to the east might present greater opportunities for successful development. 
 
The Eurasian Union’s path to the world system as a component part based on neo-liberal 
economic principles has been effectively closed off by Western policies. The Chinese leg 
should provide a stronger one to stand on as the European Union has shot itself in the other 
leg. The foreign policy stance of the USA echoed by the EU to Russia, particularly over 
Ukraine, may have been a tipping point. 
 
In the absence of such a negotiated settlement bringing the EEU into closer alignment with 
the hegemonic core, the alternative is the development of a competing geo-political bloc. The 
Eurasian Economic Union is more likely to evolve as a ‘counterpoint’, relying on greater state 
coordination and regulation economically under an autocratic political system. However, the 
EEU cannot be effective on its own; it is economically too weak to mount a very serious 
challenge to the European part of the hegemonic core. Its share of global GDP is only 4 per cent 
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(IMF WEO, 2015). To build any significant alternative to the neo-liberal global order, it would 
need to combine with countries in other semi-core countries.  
 
Rise of a Competing Geo-Political Bloc 
Since the Ukrainian conflict the Russian leadership has given more emphasis to linkages with 
the Asian-Pacific area and has strengthened ties to groupings such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation and the BRICS countries. A consequence of misguided Western 
policy has been to push Russia to the East – economically and politically.  
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Figure 8. Proportion of world GDP 1980-2014: BRICS, European Union, Eurasian Economic 
Union and NAFTA.Purchasing power parity (Current international dollars). 
Share of World GDP: Major World Economic 
Blocs, 1980-2013
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Data Base, 2015.  
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015. Purchasing power parity (Current 
international dollars). 
 
The decline in the world share of GDP for the USA and the phenomenal rise of China has led 
to the formation of four major economic groups which are shown on Figure 8. We note the 
economic decline of NAFTA and the EU against the rise of the BRICS countries. The export 
of value added manufactures is also an index of economic dynamism. The United States has 
also experienced a decline in its value added exports. As we note from Figure 9, US exports 
of high technology products (as a proportion of all manufactured exports) declined from 2000 
in the face of the rise of Chinese manufactured exports. 
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Figure 9. High Technology Exports; USA, China and Russia 1998 to 2014 
High Technology Exports: USA, China and 
Russia 1998 to 2014
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High technology exports as per cent of manufactured exports (WB, 2015). 
 
Another robust measure of the declining power of the Western core countries is the number 
of companies listed in the top 2000 world companies. The Forbes List measures the strength 
of companies in terms of four variables: sales, profits, assets and market value. The changing 
pattern between 2009 and 2015 is captured in Figure 10 which compares the number of 
companies in the top 2000 for the USA, China and the BRICS countries combined. 
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Figure 10.  Number of Companies in the World Top 2000: USA, Japan and BRICS: 2009 and 
2015. 
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Measured by aggregate of sales, profits, assets and market value (Forbes 2000).  
 
The changing pattern of world economic power is shifting away from the Western dominant 
core. By 2015, Asia had 691 companies, compared to Europe’s 486. The rise for the BRICS 
even in the six years studied here is notable. In this period, China has outstripped Japan, and 
the BRICS combined were just over 60 per cent of the number of US companies. They 
included 57 Indian, 27 Russian, 24 Brazilian and 14 South African companies; and China had 
5 companies in the top 10 and 13 in the top 100. Unlike Russia, whose top companies were 
predominantly in energy extraction, China has a good spread of companies across the 
economic sectors. I return to the significance of these figures below; here we note that 
significant changes have taken place in the economic power of the traditional core members 
of the world economy; the EEU, with only 28 top companies in 2015, is a minor economic 
player. 
 
The aggressive trade sanctions towards Russia have had the effect of reinforcing the rise of a 
geo-political bloc based on the Eurasian Union and the BRICS, especially China. The geo-
political consequences of Western policy push the members of the Eurasian Economic Union 
to the east, to the strengthening of non-Western associations of states such as the BRICS and the 
SCO. In 2007, they formed a Development Bank which is potentially an alternative to the World 
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Bank. At the 2015 Ufa summit, the EEU has (or will) set up free trade areas with Vietnam, 
Egypt, India, Israel, South Korea, Chile and South America. For countries in the semi-core of 
the world system, regionalism need not entail being absorbed into the hegemonic bloc of the G7 
countries. China, Russia, India, Brazil and Venezuela and constituents of regional groups 
(Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Community, MERCOSUR, and 
ASEAN) can strengthen their position against hegemonic powers. The growing power of its 
economic base gives such countries political influence and military power. While not matching 
the armed forces of the USA, when combined these countries also have considerable military 
power.  
 
How the Post-Socialist States fit into the World System 
 Following the dismantling of the state socialist political and economic system, post-socialist 
societies have developed along different trajectories to become part of the capitalist world 
system. After the establishment of independent nation states, all the post-socialist societies 
subsequently have joined or formed regional groupings. Regionalisation is a consequence of the 
weakness of nation states against the power of transnational companies as well as a defence 
against, or the extension of the influence of, the power of hegemonic states. The membership of 
regional groupings defines their place in the world economic and political system.   
 
How one analyses the ‘world system’ of states is contentious. In Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
paradigm, market relations are the predominant form of regulation of the world-economy 
which functions as a single economy system (it is a world-system, rather than a world system 
(Wallerstein, 1979, p. 13))4. The world economy is usually a three-fold analysis of core, 
periphery and semi-periphery. The core is composed of the leading industrial and post-
industrial states in which the dominant multi-national corporations are located. These 
countries currently share to a greater or lesser extent the values of neo-liberalism and the 
institutions of electoral democracy. The military-economic core of the world system is 
composed of a hegemonic block dominated by capitalist interests in the USA. In Wallerstein’s 
                         
4
 Wallerstein claims that the world-economy economy included the 'entire world, including 
those states ideologically committed to socialism [then the Soviet bloc and China]'. (Wallerstein, 
1979). On the unity of the world-system see p. 271.  
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approach, the corporations located in these countries are driven by the need for economic 
accumulation (profit) which they extract from the semi-periphery and periphery
2
. The core 
states exercise ‘ideological hegemony’ – predominantly neo-liberalism (Hettne, 2001, pp. 3-
4). Bjorn Hettne and other writers define the regions within the ‘core’ as Europe (the EU), 
North America (NAFTA) and East Asia – ‘the Triad’. The ‘new regionalism’ approach 
associated with writers like Hettne brings out the importance of regions defined by non-
economic as well as economic features – forms of social identity; religious, political and social 
values; historically based conceptions of state power. Regions become successors to nation 
states to give greater political security as well as economic density. They are driven not only by 
economic interests but held together by national and religious identities. The European Union is 
held together economically by the ideology of neo-liberalism, and politically by democracy 
promotion; it is weakened by having no single language, religion or social identity – indeed, it 
has a history of internal wars based on national hostility. Eurasianism is a civilisational concept 
with common language, national, religious and statist components.  
 
The semi-periphery (or intermediary regions (Hettne, 2005, p.279)) is formed from a group of 
countries which possess their own national corporations but are concurrently subject to 
exploitation from multi-national companies – often enabled by the political power of foreign 
states. Such formations are unstable and, according to Wallerstein, due to the superior form of 
accumulation of the core countries (as well as their military capacity), they are unable to 
continue as separate formations and are brought into the dominant core or go to the periphery. 
The transition of the former state socialist societies of Eastern Europe to New Member State 
status of the European Union would be an example here. But in this case, they indicate an 
unexpected phenomenon – they have become independent countries within the core region 
which are analogous to declining areas (such as Michigan State) in industrialised countries.  
 
The weakness of these approaches is that neither Wallerstein nor Hettne give sufficient attention 
to the diversity of, and conflict between, regions within the core and alliances with regions in the 
periphery. They are unable to explain the rise of states which challenge the dominant states in 
the hegemonic core. Regional geo-political interests may overcome the global interest of 
corporate business. Assumptions, based on conceptions of a unitary political and economic 
hegemonic bloc are no longer valid. The rise of China and the BRICS presents a challenge to the 
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hegemonic core. Such countries are less exposed to global capitalist interests and have a 
potential for internally led economic development. The leaders of the EEU and China can 
adopt a more independent policy in international affairs and promote domestic national 
geopolitical interests. The tensions between the Russian leadership and leading Western 
nations also reflect the attempts of the Russian leadership to maintain a Russian national 
presence in strategic industries. Such economic and geo-political differences lead to the 
exclusion of semi-core countries from the economic (EU) and military organisations (NATO) 
of the dominant core.  
 
The ‘core’ of the world system has many parts. There is a ‘hegemonic bloc’ dominated 
economically, politically and militarily by the United States. Within this bloc are a number of 
elite subordinates. The new ‘member states’ of the European Union are nation states 
dependent on institutions and values shaped by the dominant core members.  
 
Rather than a unitary core around the USA, there is a growing diversity promoted by the EEU 
and the BRICS and a fragmentation of the dominant ‘core’ states which are divided by 
economic and political blocs. The statist character of China and Russia may restrain their own 
transnational companies from full integration into the world economy and concurrently, the 
USA and EU may discriminate against their affiliates. Such formations have (or may develop) 
their own specific national or state capitalism (some may have socialist characteristics). 
Whatever their economic complexion, they have different political and social identities to those 
of the hegemonic core members.    
 
We might distinguish between an incumbent hegemonic core and an ascendant semi-core. The 
term, semi-core, captures the economic and political status of countries like China, Russia, India, 
and Brazil. The theoretical underpinning of the ‘semi-periphery’ in the Wallerstein perspective 
is predicated on countries that have national companies and are also subject to exploitation by 
imperialist transnationals. Semi-core, however, refers to countries which have their own 
transnational corporations, are hosts to foreign corporations and concurrently have their own 
national companies. These economies are subject to reproduction without falling into the 
periphery or joining the dominant core. 
 
 
 
29 
For countries in the semi-core of the world system, regionalism does not entail adopting the 
principles of neo-liberal globalisation, but enables groups of states to strengthen their position 
against hegemonic powers – if they so wish and if they need to. Regional blocs such as Eurasia 
and the SCO may develop a form of state led developmental capitalism based on principles 
different to neo-liberalism (Vayrynen, 2003, p. 25-51; Molchanov, 2015, p. 154). 
 
The unitary capitalist ‘core’ has broken down. In the post-socialist countries, developments 
such as the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation5, the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation6, the Eurasian Economic Community7 and the Organisation of Central 
Asian Cooperation8, are evidence of the rise of regional economic and political blocs. Latin 
American countries, such as Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela (MERCOSUR), constitute a trading 
bloc having less dependency on the hegemonic capitalist core.   
 
Within the ascendant semi-core are contradictory economic dynamics. A growing number of 
transnational corporations in countries like Russia and China favour neo-liberal policies which 
would facilitate their expansion and the repatriation of company profits (from which states also 
benefit somewhat). While China as well as the Eurasian states are less exposed to global capital 
and have a potential for internally led economic development, they also contain neo-liberal 
interests which derive from domestic companies seeking a status in Western markets as well 
as politicians and intellectuals driven by liberal ideology. The possibility of the EEU 
becoming a ‘stepping-stone’ (as Hettne has put it) to the dominant core cannot be ruled out. 
The EU and NAFTA type of region is essentially a means to promote neo-liberal policies of 
market competitiveness and to contain member states in the world economy dominated by 
Western companies. Adopting a programme of free movement involving goods, services, 
labour and capital limits the powers of nation states to pursue a developmentalist policy 
independent of market indicators.  
 
A more limited form of regional association or multinational agreements would be better 
                         
5
 Composed of China, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. 
6
 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
7
 Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. 
8
 Russia, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
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suited to further development in the Eurasian states. The economic model of the European 
Free Trade Area, with limited political powers and other forms of cooperation, such as 
intergovernmental agreements and bi-lateral links with third parties, such as other members 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation might be more appropriate. Other forms of 
regional integration, cultural and social in form, could be pursued along the lines of the 
British Commonwealth. The British Empire adopted forms of Commonwealth (or Imperial) 
Preference which involved reciprocally-enacted tariffs and free trade agreements which took 
into account the different interests of the Dominions and colonies. As well as stimulating 
intra Empire trade, it also shielded the UK from foreign competition. Such a regulated 
regional association would be able to develop an alternative value system to that of neo-liberal 
global capitalism, with a greater emphasis put on economic development and social security – 
the provision of employment, more equal distribution of income and wealth, less poverty, and 
the expansion of local and regional industries.  These objectives cannot be achieved under a neo-
liberal world economy.  
 
A crucial political variable is the extent to which the Eurasian Union’s energy companies remain 
under government ownership and control. Greater foreign ownership would shift the balance of 
economic forces in the direction of neo-liberalism and to an assimilation into the hegemonic 
core. In China, one witnesses a hybrid system with important divisions contained by, and 
reflected in, the Communist Party of China. There is a strong political faction which seeks 
further movement into the world neo-liberal economy and a strengthening of market principles. 
On the other hand, this group is confronted by a more traditional collectivist faction supporting 
socialist public ownership and development of state welfare. Crucially, if this faction can regain 
hegemony then China will move away from the neo-liberal tendency and policy would become 
more national and possibly state socialist in form.  
 
One likely future scenario for the EEU is an enhanced form of regional economic organisation, 
along the lines of a strengthened Shanghai Cooperation Organisation which legitimates both 
international and national accumulation for their own national companies. The puzzle here for 
economic and political policy is to devise a regional association to give its members greater 
mobility of the factors of production while concurrently furthering a national developmental 
policy.  
 
 
31 
 
References 
 
Bassin, Mark, Glebov, Sergey and Laruelle, Marlene (2015), Between Europe and Asia. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Borocs, Jozsef (2015), ‘Geopolitical scenarios for European integration’, in F. Miszlivets and  
Jody Jensen (eds), Reframing Europe’s future. Abingdon: Palgrave, pp.19-34. 
 
Chizhov, Vladimir (2015), ‘Eurasian Economic Union: Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov's 
interview with Euobserver‘, 2015-01-02, available at: 
http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/eurasian-economic-union-ambassador-vladimir-
chizhovs-interview-euobserver#sthash.jZUr2PD0.dpuf. Accessed 10 February 2016. 
 
Drahokoupil, Jan (2009), Globalisation and the State in Central and Eastern Europe: the 
politics of foreign direct investment. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Forbes, 2000, Forbes 2000 companies, available at: http://www.forbes.com/forbes. Accessed 
10 February 2016. 
 
Chicago Tribune (1998), Statement of Boris Yeltsin at meeting with Jacques Chirac and 
Helmut Kohl in Bor, Russia on 27 March 1998, as reported in Chicago Tribune, available at: 
www.articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-03-27. Accessed 10 February 2016. 
 
Emerson, Michael (2005), ‘From Awkward Partnership to a Greater Europe’, in Emerson, 
Michael (ed.), Readings in European Security, Vol. 3, London and Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies, pp.1-28. 
 
Hettne, B. (2005), ‘Regionalism and the World Order’, unpublished paper. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO) data base (Referred to 
as IMF WEO), 2015 WEO data base, available at: 
 
 
32 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx. Accessed 10 
February 2016. 
 
Maddison Project (2013), Maddison Project database, available at: 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version. Accessed 10 
February 2016. 
 
Mannin, Mike (ed.) (1999), Pushing Back the Boundaries. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, pp. 38-9. 
 
Moscow Times (1994), Yeltsin Set to Seal Key Pact With EU, 24 June 1994, accessed at:  
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/yeltsin-set-to-seal-key-pact-with-
eu/211422.html. Accessed 10 February 2016. 
 
Molchanov, Mikhail (2015), A. Eurasian Regionalisms and Russian Foreign Policy, 
Farnham: Ashgate.  
 
Lavrov, Sergei (2014), Speech to the UN General Assembly, 27 September 2014, available 
at: http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/CDEA7854FF002B5A44257D62004F7236. Accessed 
10 February 2016. 
 
Putin, Vladimir (2011), A New Integration Project for Eurasia: the Future in the Making.  
Izvestiia 3 October 2011, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-
ru/dv/dru_2013_0320_06_/dru_2013_0320_06_en.pdf. Accessed 10 February 2016. 
 
Serfati, Claude (2015), The EU Integration As A Structural Uneven Process. 
 
United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD), available at: 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders 
 
Vayrynen, Raimo (2003), ‘Regionalism: Old and New’, International Studies Review, No 5, 
Issue 1,  pp. 25-51. 
 
 
33 
 
Vinokurov, Evegeny and Taras Tsukarov (2015), Agenda for the EEU Economy. Moscow. 
Valdai Discussion Club, Paper No 25. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979), The Capitalist World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press). 
 
World Bank (WB) (2015), World Development Indicators, available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org, accessed 10 February 2016. 
 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (2015), World Trade Organization data base data selection 
for 2009, available at  https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm 
s, accessed 10 February 2016. 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
 
1
 Definitions of groups of countries by the IMF have a geographical base. The definitions 
used in this paper are: Asean – 5: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
The Commonwealth of Independent States: 12 countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Georgia, which is not a member of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, is included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities  
in economic structure.  
The EU 28: 28 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Romania, and United Kingdom. 
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
Major advanced economies (G7): 7 countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom, and United States.  
2
 Countries of the periphery have no transnational corporations. Their economies are based on 
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agriculture and the primary sector and much of production is for direct use rather than for 
exchange on the world marker. They possess small national companies and host subsidiaries 
of the transnational companies which export commodities (usually in the form of primary 
materials). They are dependents of the core and to a lesser extent the semi-core countries. 
Politically they are pre-modern in character. They are not part of the modern world system of 
global military alliances but experience internal civil wars.  
 
